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1 Introduction
The definition of the relevant geographic and product markets is a paramount
concern in antitrust investigations; see, for example, the Groceries Market inquiry
(2007) carried out by the UK Competition Commission.1 This paper provides an
empirical framework for the delineation of local retail markets. In its conceptual
part, it formalizes an algorithm to empirically identify local markets. And it
proposes measures of the intensity of competition in such markets. One of the key
building blocks of this framework is a micro-level demand model that captures
consumers’ trade-off between pecuniary and distance costs. In the empirical part
of the paper, a micro-level demand model is developed that combines firm level
and socio-demographic characteristics to estimate UK consumers’ preferences for
grocery store choice, allowing for heterogeneous sensitivity with regard to distance
and pecuniary costs.
Spatial competition and endogenous market definition on the basis of firm level
and socio-demographic data have received increasing attention in the academic
empirical industrial organization literature. Mehta (2007) and Zwanziger et al.
(2002) investigate the US nursing home industry, while Davis (2006) focusses
on movie theaters and Smith (2004) on UK grocery retailing. The common
approach to market definition is the so-called hypothetical monopolist test which
is routinely, though typically informally, applied in antitrust investigations. It
iteratively examines the hypotheses that a hypothetical monopolistic owner of
successively expanding sets of retail outlets, ceteris paribus, could profitably
impose a small, but significant and non-transitory price increase. This test rests
on two essential building blocks: a demand-side model that captures consumers’
inclinations to switch between outlets; and a supply-side model that captures the
change in the hypothetical monopolist’s profit from joint ownership as a function
of the contemplated price increase and changes in costs. Section 2 of this paper
formalizes this test on the basis of units of observations as they are typically
available in competition inquiries. This formalism provides the context for the
remainder of the paper which focusses on the demand-side considerations of this
framework to geographic market definition.
1 See http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2006/grocery/index.htm for details.
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On the demand side, the primary determinants of switching that are of interest,
and amenable to empirical investigation, are prices and relative distances between
consumers and alternative retail outlets. Studies such as those by some of the
aforementioned authors, as well as many antitrust inquiries, examine competition
within existing market structures and, typically, use aggregate data that are defined
on the level of such pre-defined markets, e.g. market shares and population density
measures in lieu of actual household locations and distances to stores. With the
increasing abundance of micro-level demand data, there appears to be scope for a
refinement of the demand side analysis. Following Smith (2004), this paper utilizes
matched micro-level data sets to approach demand side considerations to market
definition from a micro-econometric perspective. In contrast to Smith (2004), this
analysis utilizes price information. Smith’s analysis aggregates consumer choices
up to 9 UK regions as markets in which firms are assumed to set homogenous prices
across their respective stores, and uses a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium assumption to
infer price parameters in consumers’ conditional indirect utility. The analysis in
this paper proceeds on a disaggregated basis. This approach avoids conditioning the
analysis on pre-defined notions of market boundaries, as well as other aggregation
issues and potential biases that arise when matching up market level shares and
population density measures with consumer level demand models.2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a formal characterization
of the algorithm that is commonly referred to as the hypothetical monopolist test;
it also proposes measures for the intensity of competition in local markets3. This
section is intended as the context for the remainder of the paper. The empirical core
of the paper starts with Section 3, describing the micro data underlying the analysis.
Section 4 provides an outline of the micro-econometric demand model. Section 5
summarizes the main features of the estimation methodology and addresses various
related computational aspects. Section 6 presents and discusses estimation results.
And Section 7 provides a brief concluding summary.
2 A variant of the demand model presented in this paper is published as Appendix 4.2 to the UK
Competition Commission’s Provisional Findings in the Groceries inquiry (2007). The responsibility
for that document lies with the Competition Commission.
3 Measuring the intensity of competition is often important in assessing whether contemplated or
anticipated mergers of retail chains induce a lessening of local competition that is substantial enough
to warrant structural remedies, such as store divestments or blocking the merger altogether.
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2 A Topology for Local Market Topography
2.1 Demographic Market Definition
Partition geographic space into N areas, indexed by i ∈ I = {1, · · · ,N}. In
economic geography, these are sometimes referred to as output areas. Associate
with each partition a “representative consumer”, also indexed by i. Suppose that
for each representative consumer i a demand model is estimated, e.g. of the form
considered in the empirical part of this paper. Let si j denote the share of i’s demand
satisfied at store j, where j belongs to the set J of all stores. And let Ji denote the
set of stores that satisfy i’s demand, i.e.
Ji = { j ∈ J : si j > 0}.
Let µi denote the total demand or expenditure brought to the market(s) by consumer
i. This, in a sense, captures the demand side of the market.
From the perspective of firm j ∈ Ji, the amount si jµi is the total demand or
expenditure accruing at store j that is attributable to consumer i. Analogous to
the demand side of the market, the supply side, from the perspective of store j, is
characterized by the set
I j = {i ∈I : si j > 0},
i.e. the set of all representative consumers a share of whose demand is satisfied by
store j. The total demand accruing at store j is
q j = ∑
i∈I j
si jµi.
Next, the impact of a rise in store j’s price, p j, on demand accruing at store
k, k 6= j, will be examined. Under conventional monotonicity assumptions on
consumer preferences, the own-price effect is a reduction in si j for all i ∈ I j, while
the cross-price effect is an increase in sim for all m ∈ Ji \{ j}, where i ∈ I j, i.e. for
m∈⋃i∈I j Ji\{ j}; the latter is the set of all stores at which any of store j’s customers
also shop. Hence, if k 6∈⋃i∈I j Ji \{ j}, then demand at store k is unaffected. If, on
the other hand, k ∈⋃i∈I j Ji \{ j}, then sik, and therefore demand sikµi, rises for all
i ∈ I j∩ Ik. Therefore, demand qk accruing at store k depends on the vector or prices
pk = [p j] j∈⋃i∈Ik Ji .
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Henceforth, this will be reflected in the notation qk(pk). This dependence of
demand accruing at any store on prices of other stores is, of course, an implication
of the underlying demand model for different consumers shopping at that store, but
each having different sets of choice alternatives.
The chain of inter-dependences of stores’ demands and prices allows to define
monopolizable markets. These will be collections of stores whose collective price
increase is profitable. Such collections will not partition the set J of all stores, i.e.
a given store can belong to several monopolizable markets.
Consider a collection of stores C. Total profits of this collection is
pi(C) = ∑
j∈C
[(p j− c j)q j(p j)−Fj] ,
where c j and Fj are store j’s marginal and fixed costs, respectively.4 The change in
joint profits due to a joint price change is then
∆pi(C) = ∑
j∈C
q j(p j)+∑
j∈C
[
(p j− c j)∑
k∈C
[
1{pk∈p j}
∂
∂ pk
q j(p j)
]]
.
For practical purposes, a small, but significant and non-transitory price increase
(SSNIP) of 5 or 10 percent is the conventional thought experiment. The stores
in C belong to the same antitrust market if the change in joint profits ∆pi(C)
is positive and ∆pi(C \ { j}) is non-positive for all j ∈ C; i.e. substitution of
marginal consumers away from stores inC \{ j}, e.g. to store j, renders the SSNIP
unprofitable, while substitution to stores outside C is too limited to undermine the
profitability of the SSNIP. From an operational point of view, in order to define
a local market that a particular store, say k, belongs to, this approach would be
applied iteratively, starting with C = {k} and expanding C by successively adding
nearby stores.
Under symmetry assumptions, cross effects will cancel out, leading to a simpli-
fication of the expression for ∆pi(C). Define the set of consumers that is captive
with respect to C by
C (C) = {i ∈I : Ji ⊆C},
4 Marginal costs are treated as constant for simplicity; this can easily be generalized.
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and the set of firm j’s consumers that are peripheral to C by
P j(C) = {i ∈ I j : Ji \C 6= /0}, j ∈C.
Customers of store j in the peripheral set are those who have store options outside
C, i.e. they are marginal or not captive.5 Then, the effect of the collective price
change on joint profits is
∆pi(C) = ∑
j∈C
q j(p j)+∑
j∈C
[
(p j− c j)∑
k∈C
[
∑
i∈P j(C)
1{pk∈pi}
∂
∂ pk
si j(pi)µi
]]
,
where pi = [p j] j∈Ji .6
Example: As an illustration, consider the following example, visualized in
Figure 1. In this example, there are 9 representative consumers (C1-C9) and 3
stores (S1-S3).
The consumers choices are indicated by links to the respective store locations,
so that
J1 = J4 = J7 = {2}, J2 = J3 = {1}
J5 = {1,2,3}, J6 = {1,3}, J8 = {2,3}, J9 = {3}.
The areas from which demand accrues at the stores are
I1 = {2,3,5,6}
I2 = {1,4,5,7,8}
I3 = {5,6,8,9}.
In this example, the prices relevant to the three stores are
p1 = [p j] j∈⋃ I1Ji = [p j] j∈{J2∪J3∪J5∪J6} = [p1, p2, p3]′
p2 = [p j] j∈{J1∪J4∪J5∪J7∪J8} = [p1, p2, p3]
′
p3 = [p j] j∈{J5∪J6∪J8∪J9} = [p1, p2, p3]
′.
5 Note that
⋃
j∈CP j(C) = {i ∈
⋃
I j : Ji \C 6= /0}= {i ∈⋃ I j : Ji \C = /0}c ⊆ C (C)c.
6 Note that p j is the concatenation of pi for all i ∈ I j.
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Figure 1: Example of a consumer (C) and store (S) configuration
Consider a coalition of stores C = {2,3}. For this coalition, since
J1,J4,J7,J8,J9 ⊆C, the set of captive consumers is
C (C) = {1,4,7,8,9},
and the consumers peripheral to the coalition members are
P2(C) = {5}, P3(C) = {5,6}.
This completes the illustrative example. 
This setup allows to distinguish different classes of competitor stores of a store
k, say, depending on the degree to which these stores are linked to store k via a
chain of customers and other stores. This essentially maps out a topography of
competition around a given stores or a chain of substitution.
Define the set of direct competitors of store k by
C(0)k = { j ∈ J \{k} : Ik∩ I j 6= /0}.
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Direct competitors are stores that share customers with store k. The first level
of stores indirectly competing with k are those that share customers with direct
competitors. Define accordingly the first degree competitive periphery of store k
by
C(1)k = { j ∈ J \{k} : I j ∩ Im 6= /0,m ∈C(0)k }.
Note that C(0)k ⊂C(1)k . This permits to inductively define the competitive periphery
of degree s by
C(s)k = { j ∈ J \{k} : I j ∩ Im 6= /0,m ∈C(s−1)k }, s= 1, · · · ,
where C(s−1)k ⊂C(s)k for positive integers s.
This sequence of sets defines a hierarchy of dependence of store k’s strategic
decisions, e.g. with regard to price, on the strategic decisions of its competitors.
Conditional on the decisions by stores j ∈C(0)k , k’s decisions are independent of
the decisions of store j ∈C(1)k \C(0)k , and therefore independent of the decisions
by stores j ∈C(s)k \C(0)k for s = 1, · · ·. More generally, conditional on decisions
by stores j ∈ C(t)k , for some t = 0,1, · · ·, store k’s decisions are independent of
the decisions of stores j ∈C(t+1)k \C(t)k , and therefore of independent of those by
stores j ∈C(s)k \C(t)k for s= t+1, · · ·. This is akin to a backward first-order Markov
property operating within the competitive topography around a store.
2.2 Measures of Intensity of Local Competition
Suppose a collection of stores C has been identified as a hypothetically monopoliz-
able market, as above. The set C can be partitioned into non-overlapping sets of
stores J f belonging to different fascias f ∈F out of the set of all fasciasF , so
that C =
⋃
f∈F (J f ∩C).
Denote the hypothetical monopoly profit with respect to the stores in C by
piM(C) = max
p j, j∈C
{
∑
j∈C
[(p j− c j)q j(p j)−Fj]
}
.
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Similarly, denote the actual, empirically observable joint oligopoly profits by
piE(C) = ∑
f∈F
max
p j, j∈(J f∩C)
{
(p j− c j)q j(p j)−Fj
∣∣p−f } ,
where the maximizations are over the set of fascia-level prices, given the optimal
level of prices of competing fascias, denoted by p−f = [pk]k∈C\J f .
7 Finally, denote
the hypothetical joint oligopoly profits of stores setting prices individually by
piC(C) = ∑
j∈C
max
p j
{
(p j− c j)q j(p j)−Fj
∣∣p−j } ,
where p−j = [pk]k∈C\{ j}. The value pi
C(C) is the most competitive (hypothetical)
profit outcome, given the local market defined by the set of stores C, and can as
such serve as a benchmark to assess effective competition. Note that under these
hypothetical pricing conduct scenarios, the functional forms of demand accruing at
the various stores are assumed to remain the same. This means that it is implicitly
assumed that a different store owner/price setter, apart from price, does not alter
any other demand relevant features (quality, range, service) of the store. Hence, this
approach, as more generally the entire hypothetical monopolist test methodology,
amounts to a partial equilibrium analysis.
Since joint profits are expected to be non-increasing with increasing levels of
competition, on the basis of these definitions it follows that
piM(C)≥ piE(C)≥ piC(C).
In other words, the empirically observable profit outcome piE(C) is expected to
lie somewhere between two hypothetical extremes, the profit outcomes of the
hypothetical monopolistic and the hypothetical competitive conduct. One measure
of effective competition one might consider, then, is the ratio
s(C) =
piM(C)−piE(C)
piM(C)−piC(C) ∈ [0,1],
which quantifies the degree to which the empirical outcome attains the hypothetical
competitive outcome, conditional on the set of stores C.
7 Note that different stores of a given fascia are allowed to charge different prices.
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Alternatively, a utility based welfare measure can be considered. Let the
hypothetical monopolistic prices be
[pMj (C)] j∈C = arg maxp j, j∈C
{
∑
j∈C
[(p j− c j)q j(p j)−Fj]
}
,
and similarly the hypothetical competitive prices
pCj (C) = maxp j
{
(p j− c j)q j(p j)−Fj
∣∣p−j } j ∈C,
while [pEj (C), j ∈ C] denote the observed prices. Then, along the lines of the
conditional indirect utility model outlined in the empirical part of the paper, let
V (pM(C)) be the consumers’ (aggregate) indirect utility, conditional on the hypo-
thetical monopolistic prices, while V (pC(C)) and V (pE(C)) denote the indirect
utilities conditional on the hypothetical competitive and empirically observed
prices, respectively. With conditional indirect utility, the competitive ranking is
V (pM(C))≤V (pE(C))≤V (pC(C)).
Taking the hypothetically competitive outcome as the benchmark, the degree of
consumer welfare achieved relative to hypothetical competition can be measured
by
su(C) =
V (pE(C))
V (pC(C))
.
This completes the formal framework for antitrust market delineation and
competitive assessment. It rests on two essential components: the demand model
that characterizes switching behavior in response to price changes, such as a SSNIP,
conditional on store attributes, such as distance to consumers, amongst others
including e.g. range and stores size; and profit calculations, which require cost data
or, as a potentially crude approximation, margin data.8 This framework provides
the context for the following demand analysis for grocery shopping in the UK,
which explicitly captures consumer heterogeneity in the trade-off between the
sensitivity to price and distance.
8 Davis (2006) carries out an analysis based on margins.
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3 Data
The remainder of the paper presents results from the estimation of a micro-level
consumer choice model, based on TNS consumer choice data. This analysis is of
interest in its own right, as it sheds light on substitution patterns that are relevant
in antitrust investigations. The analysis summarized in this part models consumer
level choice of supermarket fascia for a consumer’s one-stop shopping (OSS) and
non-OSS trips.9
The TNS data used in this analysis are UK household level data on grocery
shopping trips.10 The sample comprises n= 11382 households for whom various
socio-demographic measures are observed, such as residential location in terms
of UK output area, household size, social grade, ownership of cars and various
others which were not used in the present analysis. Each household reports on each
grocery shopping trip, using a home scanner, recording date and retail outlet, total
spend and an itemized list of grocery items purchased.11 The present analysis draws
on TNS data relating to the 4-week period 09 Oct - 05 Nov 2006 and considers two
types of shopping trips: random one-stop shopping (OSS) trips, defined for each
household as a random trip out of all shopping trips with expenditure at least 60
percent of average weekly spending; and random non-OSS trips, defined for each
household as a random trip out of all shopping trips with expenditure less than 60
percent of average weekly spending.12.
The TNS data were merged with data on attributes of UK retail outlets by
the main retailers, including fascia, location, store size, presence of petrol station,
9 See below for a definition of OSS and non-OSS. Data on the two types of shopping trips are
analyzed separately, although it is recognized that a more comprehensive model of dynamic shopping
behavior would account for their dependence through intra-household inventory management.
10 The TNS data sample was provided by the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the UK Competition
Commission.
11 TNS state that the scanner data are corroborated by purchase receipts which TNS households are
asked to submit.
12 The analysis considers single OSS and non-OSS trips per household. The academic literature to
date offers little in terms of tractable dynamic microeconomic consumer choice models, hence this
approach, to a considerable extent, is predicated by this fact. A feasible alternative would be to treat
multiple trips per household as independent, but as this would presumably be a misrepresentation of
the data generating process it was not further pursued in the present analysis
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ATMs, cafeteria/restaurant and toilets at the retail outlet.13 Using mapping software,
for each household in the TNS data set a household specific choice set for grocery
shopping was constructed which consists of all the stores with net sales area of at
least 280 m2 within 20 mins drive time around the center of the consumer’s output
area; if there are less than 30 stores for a consumer within 20 mins drive-time, the
choice set also includes more distant stores, up to a maximum drive time of 90
mins. As a by-product, household-store distances are recorded as additional store
attributes from the household’s perspective.14
Finally, in order to carry out an analysis beyond a merely hedonic approach
which solely rests on non-pecuniary choice attributes, for each store a price mea-
sure was constructed. This measure amounts to a weighted average price for a
selection of branded goods which are sold by all retailers that are considered in this
analysis.15 Further details on the construction of this price measure are provided in
Appendix A.16
Summary statistics of the sample of TNS households are given in Table 1, and
of the stores in the union of choice sets in Table 2.
13 The analysis looks at Asda, Coop, Marks & Spencer, Morrisons, Sainsbury’s, Somerfield, Tesco
and Waitrose.
14 It is worth noting that not all store characteristics are available for every store. This means that,
in the actual analysis, stores for which the respective characteristics are not observed could not
be considered. This leads to choice sets for some households which contain fewer than 30 choice
alternatives.
15 Preliminary analyses also experimented with the weighted average price for a wider selection of
goods that also includes certain non-branded items, as well as with un-weighted price measures.
These measures suffer from potential measurement error due to unobserved quality differences which,
in turn, is likely to introduce bias in estimation. They were therefore not considered any further.
16 There is a concern that the constructed price index does not accurately reflect determinants of
consumer choice, especially if consumers are very receptive to discounts. On the basis of the data
used for this analysis, it is difficult to identify this kind of shopping behavior, however.
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HH size Cars Social Grade OSS Non-OSS Choice
(in %) (in %) (in %) (%) (Spend, £) (Spend, £) (# alt.s)
0 - 15.67 A,B 10.7 5 9.41 1.28 14
1 20.83 51.80 C1,C2 59.0 25 24.63 4.53 19
2 34.93 28.16 D,E 30.3 50 42.52 9.15 23
3 16.76 3.39 75 66.13 16.84 34
4 18.24 0.73 95 111.44 34.72 54
5 6.82 0.15
≥ 6 2.43 0.10
Table 1: Broad summary statistics, TNS sample
Sales Area Distance Price Other Attributes ∃ ∈ Choice set
(%) (net, in m2) (in mins) (in £) (in %) Fascia (in %)
min 241 1 2.26 Petrol 31.6 Asda 89.9
25 818 12 2.36 ATMs 70.4 Coop 69.3
50 1640 17 2.62 Café 40.0 M& S 94.6
75 3326 20 3.17 Toilets 58.3 Morrisons 89.3
max 9566 90 4.39 Sainsbury’s 92.5
Somerfield 95.6
Tesco 98.3
Waitrose 47.8
Table 2: Store attributes
4 Demand Model
This section describes the empirical model used for analysis. The model follows a wide
literature in modern empirical microeconometric demand analysis by allowing for hetero-
geneity in consumer choice, taking into account differences in consumer characteristics
that are likely to shape consumer preferences.17 The appropriate econometric framework
17 See, e.g., Hausman and Wise (1978) in the context of discrete response, and Beckert (2005), Dubin
and McFadden (1984) and Smith (2004) for joint discrete and continuous choices.
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for this analysis is a mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model for discrete response.18 The
MMNL model is a generalization of the conventional multinomial logit (MNL) model for
discrete response19, overcoming that model’s well-known implausibility of independence
from irrelevant alternatives (IIA).20 As a framework for microeconometric analysis of
discrete response, this model is also attractive for a number of other reasons. It overcomes
some of the computational intractability encountered in other discrete choice models that
do not suffer from the IIA property, such as e.g. the multinomial probit model. Moreover,
the MMNL model does not rely on severe distributional or functional form restrictions.
Indeed, the generality of the MMNL model is due to the fact, first demonstrated by McFad-
den21, that, under mild regularity conditions, any discrete choice model, arising from a
latent random utility model, can be approximated as closely as desired by a MMNL model.
The remainder of this section briefly reviews the MNL model and its main properties and
subsequently introduces the MMNL model; see McFadden and Train (2000) for further
details and discussion.22
Denote the indirect utility derived by consumer i from choosing store j in her choice
set Ji by
ui j = x′i jθ + εi j
where xi j is a vector of store attributes, possibly interacted with consumer characteristics, θ
is a parameter vector, and εi j is an idiosyncratic utility component that captures unobserved
store and consumer taste attributes, for j ∈ Ji. Assuming that εi j has a type 1 extreme
value distribution and is identically and independently distributed across i and j, the model
yields MNL choice probabilities
Pi j(xi;θ) = Pr(ui j > uik ∀k 6= j;k, j ∈ Ji)
18 See McFadden and Train (2000) for a comprehensive discussion of the MMNL model, and the
literature cited therein. Models of this type have been used previously in the microeconometric
analysis of consumer choice in retail markets; e.g. Smith (2004). The MMNL model is an essential
building block in most empirical work in industrial organization using market level data, following
Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995).
19 See McFadden (1973, 1975, 1984) and Luce (1959, 1977).
20 See, e.g., Debreu (1960). Nested multinomial logit (NMNL) models (McFadden (1978, 1981)) are
an alternative approach to overcoming the IIA problem.
21 McFadden and Train (2000), Theorem 1.
22 The MNL model presented here is often referred to as conditional logit because it conditions
on choosing within a given choice set, thereby preventing by design any substitution to a potential
outside alternative.
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=
exp(x′i jθ)
∑k∈Ji exp(x
′
ikθ)
,
where xi = (x′k)
′
k∈Ji .
Let the price of product j, p j, be an element of xi j, with parameter θ0 < 0 which is an
element of the vector θ . Note that this model, then, yields point own price elasticities of
the form
η j j(xi;θ) :=
∂Pi j(xi;θ)
∂ p j
p j
Pi j(xi;θ)
= (1−Pi j(xi;θ))p jθ0,
while point cross price elasticities are of the form
η jk(xi;θ) :=
∂Pi j(xi;θ)
∂ pk
pk
Pik(xi;θ)
=−Pik(xi;θ)pkθ0, j,k ∈ Ji,
i.e. point cross price elasticities in response to a change in pk do not vary across j (IIA
property), regardless of how close products j and k are located in characteristic space and
what relative valuation consumer i places on these.
The MMNL generalizes this model by allowing consumer i’s valuation of price and
other characteristics to depend on i’s observable and unobservable characteristics. In
doing so, the model allows for heterogeneity in consumer tastes that permits substitution
patterns in response to price changes that capture the consumer’s idiosyncratic taste for
product attributes. This implies, for example, that the MMNL model allows for consumers
who value a certain product attribute, say geographic proximity of a store, to exhibit a
higher substitution elasticity with respect to other nearby stores, rather than a substitution
elasticity that is uniform across all stores, as in the MNL model.
Define a MMNL model as a MNL model with random coefficients θ drawn from a
parametric conditional cumulative distribution function G(θ ;zi,β ), i.e.
Pi j(xi,zi;β ) =
∫
θ
Pi j(xi;θ)dG(θ ;zi,β ) = Eθ [Pi j(xi;θ)|zi;β ] ,
where zi is a vector of consumer i’s observed characteristics, Eθ [·|zi,β ] is the conditional
expectation operator with respect to the conditional distribution G(θ ;zi,β ), β is a vector
of parameters, and j ∈ Ji.23
23 This notation is more general than maybe needed. Non-random components of θ will have
probabilistic point mass at a point and can then be viewed as elements of β .
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Notice that the integral is analytically intractable and, hence, must be approximated
by simulation. Simulation can be carried out by drawing θ˜s, s= 1, · · · ,S, randomly from
G(θ ;zi,β ), conditional on zi and given β , and approximating Pi j(xi,zi;β ) by its simulated
analogue
P˜i j,S(xi,zi;β ) =
1
S
S
∑
s=1
Pi j(xi; θ˜s) = ES
[
Pi j(xi; θ˜s)|zi;β
]
,
where the operator ES[·|zi;β ] denotes an empirical expectation, or sample average, across
the S simulated MNL probabilities {Pi j(xi; θ˜s),s = 1 · · · ,S}, evaluated at the simulation
sample draws, conditional on zi and given β .
As a consequence of mixing, the point own and cross-price elasticities induced by the
MMNL model differ from their MNL counterparts, and are given by
ε j j(xi,zi;β ) :=
Eθ [Pi j(xi;θ)(1−Pi j(xi;θ))θ0p j|zi;β ]
Eθ [Pi j(xi;θ)|zi;β ] ,
ε jk(xi,zi;β ) := −Eθ [Pi j(xi;θ)Pik(xi;θ)θ0pk|zi;β ]Eθ [Pi j(xi;θ)|zi;β ] , j,k ∈ Ji,
so that the point cross-price elasticity is seen to overcome the limitations imposed by the
MNL model.
In the particular implementation of the MMNL model considered here, the coefficients
on price and drive time distance in the indirect utility are allowed to be random on
R2− = {w ∈ R2 : w1 ≤ 0,w2 ≤ 0}, with a cumulative distribution function G(θ ;zi,β ) that
is jointly log-normal, with a conditional mean that depends linearly on zi, and allowing
for the possibility of correlation between the random coefficients . The vector zi is taken
to include household size as well as indicators for social groups D and E and of car
ownership.
5 Estimation
This section provides a very brief overview of the estimation methodologies appropriate
for the empirical models examined in this analysis.
The parameter vector of interest in the MNL model θ can be estimated by maximizing
the sample log-likelihood function (ML estimation), obtaining the ML estimator (MLE)
θˆn = argmax
θ
{
n
∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ji
δi j ln(Pi j(xi;θ))
}
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for a sample of n consumers, where δi j = 1 if consumer i chooses alternative j, and δi j = 0
otherwise. Based on the MLE θˆn, point own and cross price elasticities can be estimated
as En
[
η j j(xi; θˆn)
]
and En
[
η jk(xi; θˆn)
]
, respectively, where the operator En[·] is defined
analogously as above. It is a well known result in classical econometric theory that, if the
MNL model accurately captures the true data generating process, i.e. the distributional
assumptions underlying the MNL model are valid and the indirect utility function is
appropriately specified, then the MLE is consistent, asymptotically normally distributed
and fully efficient.
This is to be compared to the estimation methodology suitable for the MMNL. The
parameters of interest of the MMNL model, β , can be estimated by maximizing the
simulated log-likleihood function (maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimation),
obtaining the MSL estimator (MSLE)
βˆn,S = argmax
β
{
n
∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ji
δi j ln
(
P˜i j,S(xi,zi;β )
)}
.
Simulation sampling introduces additional noise into the estimator, so that the asymptotic
variance-covariance matrix of the MSLE is inflated relative to the asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix of the MLE, by a factor of 1+ 1S .
24 In the application of the MMNL
model carried out in this analysis, the number of simulation sample draws is S= 10. This
induces a loss of efficiency of the MSLE relative to the MLE of about 10 percent. Clearly,
as more simulation sample draws are added, i.e. as S is increased, the relative efficiency
loss is diminished, albeit at computational cost.
In case of the MMNL model, the point own and cross price elasticities can be estimated
by En
[
ε˜ j j(xi,zi; βˆn,S)
]
and En
[
ε˜ jk(xi,zi; βˆn,S)
]
, respectively, where ε˜ jk is the simulated
analogue to ε jk which replaces the operator Eθ by ES. For the purpose of competition
assessment, arc own and cross elasticities, typically associated with a 5 percent price rise,
are of interest. In the MMNL model, define the α-percent arc price elasticity by
α jk(xi,zi;β ) =
Eθ [Pi j((xi \ pk),(1+α)pk;θ)|zi,β ]−Eθ [Pi j(xi;θ)|zi,β ]
Eθ [Pi j(xi;θ)|zi,β ] ,
where (xi \ pk) denotes the vector xi with the component pk omitted. The displayed
expression corresponds to an α-percent arc own price elasticity when j = k and an α-
percent arc cross price elasticity otherwise. Arc elasticities can readily be estimated by
ES
[
α˜ jk(xi,zi; βˆn,S)
]
, where, similarly, α˜ is a simulated analogue to α .
24 See, e.g., McFadden and Ruud (1994).
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The accuracy of the estimation of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix hinges
on the computational and numerical complexity of the estimation problem and on the
validity of the asymptotic convergence. An alternative approach to estimating the estimator
variance covariance matrix, which some authors argue is more robust and, in any event,
computationally more convenient, is to generate bootstrap replications of the estimator and
approximate the true, but unknown sampling distribution of the estimator by the empirical
distribution of the bootstrap replicates.25 The analysis presented in this paper mimics this
approach by generating 10 MSLEs on the basis of 10 samples of the entire data set and
deducing a bootstrap MSLE as the sample mean and a bootstrap variance-covariance matrix
as the sample variance-covariance matrix of these.26 Although it is not fully explored in
the present analysis, the bootstrap approach provides the additional advantage that the
variability of derived estimates, such as elasticity point estimates, can be readily assessed.
This compares favorably to the more cumbersome derivation of uncertainty estimates on
the basis of the asymptotic distribution of the estimator, using the so-called delta method
(Taylor series expansion).
6 Estimation Results
This section presents MSL estimation results, using the methodology described in the
foregoing two sections. The first part reports and compares MNL and MMNL estimates
based on the OSS data, and offers some insights from specification testing. The second
part considers some derived estimates. The third part carries out the same analysis for
non-OSS data.
25 See, e.g., Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
26 Strictly speaking, the bootstrap approach chosen here was less efficient than it could have been,
because the bootstrap samples consisted of sub-samples of the entire population, without the typical
replications. The loss in efficiency appears negligible, however, given the large sample and the results
of some auxiliary runs on larger data sets that yield point estimates that are remarkably close to the
mean bootstrap results.
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6.1 Estimation Results for OSS Data
Table 3 presents MNL and MMNL point estimates, and for the latter bootstrap standard
errors, as well as minimum and maximum bootstrap replicates.27 The table also reports
the values of the log-likelihood at the MLE for the MNL, and the value of the simulated
log-likelihood at the MSLE for the MMNL. While informative, these numbers are not
directly comparable because, conditional on the data, the former is a constant, while the
latter is a random variable, due to the additional simulation noise. In other words, repeated
simulation samples, conditional on the data, i.e. conditional on the {zi, i= 1, · · · ,n}, will
generate a distribution of the value of the simulated log-likelihood function whose variance
is due to simulation noise.
The MMNL estimation results exhibit several notable differences compared to the
MNL estimates. While the average distance effects are comparable, the MMNL model ex-
hibits a substantially larger average price sensitivity, which, next to the MMNL refinement
of the MNL, leads to different predicted substitution patterns, as shown below.28 Note that
in the MMNL model the intercepts of the random coefficients on distance correspond to
−exp(−1.2221) =−0.2946; this implies, for example, that the expected distance coeffi-
cient for a two person household of social groups A-C is -0.2250, but it is substantially
higher for households in social groups D and E. The trade-off between price and distance
is further explored below. The MMNL model estimates of the standard deviation of the
random price and distance coefficients suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity in
consumers’ distance and price sensitivity, and that, conditional on socio-demographics, on
average more price sensitive consumer are less sensitive with regard to distance. Moreover,
larger households appear to be more price sensitive than smaller ones, but less distance
sensitive; the coefficient on car ownership in the distance coefficient is presumably poorly
identified because the effect is picked up by the household size coefficient.29 The MMNL
model also appears to produce statistically significant and economically plausible fascia
27 Net sales area is in 1000 m2. The variable mission cost is defined as the interaction between spend
and net sales area, scaled by 1e−08.
28 Recall that the MMNL price and distance coefficients are specified as −exp(a+b′z), where z is a
vector of household level socio-demographics.
29 Tobit regressions of number of cars on household size and other household characteristics exhibit
a statistically significant and positive coefficient on household size, i.e. larger households tend to
have more cars. It could also be hypothesized that larger households appear more sensitive to price
because it is more likely that a household member commutes to work and carries out the household
www.economics-ejournal.org 18
conomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal
effects, unlike the MNL model. The MMNL model picks up differences in valuations
across socio-demographic groups, unlike the MNL, and if different fascias cater to different
groups, then the MMNL model would be expected to identify this in terms of different
fascia effects.
MNL std.error MMNL std.error min max
distance (intercept) -0.2412 0.0023 -1.2221 0.1275 -1.5686 -1.0961
distance (hh size) -0.1994 0.0109 -0.2207 -0.1789
distance (soc gr DE) 5.1311 0.1395 4.9730 5.4765
distance (cars> 0) -0.0000 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0000
distance (std dev) 0.5081 0.027 0.4840 0.5711
net sales area -0.0181 0.0142 -2.2435 0.0649 -2.3745 -2.1880
mission cost 3.5214 0.2005 4.3626 0.3508 4.1468 5.3263
petrol 0.1809 0.0290 4.3121 0.0966 4.2028 4.4816
ATMs 0.2749 0.0528 0.1520 0.0080 0.1459 0.1723
restaurant 0.1765 0.0334 -0.7933 0.0614 -0.8792 -0.6427
toilets 0.4914 0.0508 3.1599 1.0068 0.3354 3.7773
price (intercept) -7.6530 1.0640 4.4106 0.1200 4.1439 4.5683
price (hh size) 0.4056 0.0112 0.3870 0.4256
price (soc gr DE) 4.3542 0.2042 3.9143 4.6051
price (std dev) 1.0091 0.0298 1.0534 0.9471
Asda 16.4536 580.8978 1.8873 0.1892 1.7574 2.4038
M&S 2.08130 904.4186 -3.6754 0.7782 -4.2618 -1.5166
Morrisons 16.8094 580.8977 2.1289 0.6092 1.5108 3.8018
Sainsbury’s 18.5671 580.8975 1.1866 0.1009 0.9655 1.3818
Somerfield 23.6604 580.8976 -5.0673 0.3143 -5.5801 -4.6356
Tesco 17.0485 580.8977 5.1998 0.814 4.6477 7.4424
Waitrose 22.6120 580.8975 0.9684 0.0777 0.7703 1.0476
distance-price cov -0.3016 0.0118 -0.3232 -0.2829
log-lik. -19179 -10769
Table 3: ML and MSL coefficient point estimates; OSS data
shopping along the way. Unfortunately, the TNS data do not record the location of employment of
the main shopper of the household and, hence, do not permit to empirically examine this possibility.
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The MNL model, if appropriate, can be estimated more efficiently than the MMNL
model because, in this case it would impose valid restrictions and it does not require
simulation. Hence it is of interest to empirically examine whether the restrictions imposed
by the MNL model, which is obviously nested within the class of MMNL models, hold in
the sample. The null hypothesis of the MNL being appropriate can be tested by means of
a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. This test has the appealing property that its asymptotic
χ2 distribution does not depend on the mixing distribution. Details of the test procedure
are given in McFadden and Train (2000). For the models considered in Table 3, the LM
test statistic takes the value 438, which exceeds the 5 percent critical value of a χ22 which
is 5.99. Hence, the null hypothesis of no mixing (i.e. MNL) can be robustly rejected. It
may also be worth noting that the adjusted R2 statistic for the estimated MMNL model
of 0.69 compares favorably to the adjusted R2 statistic for the estimated MNL model,
which is 0.44.30 Strictly speaking, however, the same qualification applies with regard to
comparability as in the case of the values of the log-likelihood functions evaluated at the
estimators.
While the model appears to reproduce the sample market shares for the large fascias,
it attempts to attribute some choices to fascias which were never chosen for OSS shopping
in the sample, such as Coop and M&S; this appears to be predominantly at the expense of
Sainsbury’s predicted share. Table 4 provides a comparison of actual and predicted shares.
Fascia actual predicted
Asda 0.2348 0.2753
Coop 0 0.0395
M& S 0 0.0358
Morrisons 0.1642 0.1450
Sainsbury’s 0.2021 0.1045
Somerfield 0.0424 0.0436
Tesco 0.3416 0.3096
Waitrose 0.0150 0.0133
Table 4: Actual vs. predicted shares, MMNL model
30 The adjusted R2 is calculated as 1− (L− k)/L0, where L is the likelihood function of the model
with k parameters, and L0 is the likelihood of a model with just an intercept.
www.economics-ejournal.org 20
conomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal
6.2 Derived Estimates
On the basis of the MSLE, arc elasticities for a 5 percent price rise can be estimated, as
outlined above. The resulting estimates permit to assess the competitive constraints that
the various fascias exert on each other. Table 5 provides estimated arc elasticities. The
table can be read along its rows, i.e. it gives the proportionate change of the predicted
share of the column fascia in response to a 5 percent increase in the row fascia’s price. For
example, the top-left entry means that a 5 percent rise in Asda’s price (index) leads on
average to a reduction in the probability of consumers doing their OSS at Asda by almost
one half, indicating quite elastic store level demand. For comparison, Table 6 provides
MNL estimates of point own and cross price elasticities which by model design lack the
power to distinguish differential substitution patterns arising from consumer preference
heterogeneity.31
Asda Coop MS Morr. Sains. Somerf. Tesco Waitr.
Asda -0.4606 0.0274 0.0241 0.2086 0.0439 0.0175 0.2830 0.0146
Coop 0.0046 -0.1616 0.0082 0.0079 0.0084 0.0083 0.0075 0.0071
M&S 0.0038 0.0075 -0.1596 0.0063 0.0093 0.0073 0.0066 0.0103
Morr. 0.0529 0.0253 0.0214 -0.2677 0.0320 0.0175 0.0588 0.0138
Sains. 0.0169 0.0208 0.0247 0.0241 -0.1901 0.0179 0.0286 0.0285
Somerf. 0.0039 0.0106 0.0101 0.0072 0.0093 -0.1363 0.0063 0.0085
Tesco 0.1210 0.0541 0.0505 0.1632 0.0900 0.0339 -0.2340 0.0464
Waitr. 0.0009 0.0026 0.0040 0.0016 0.0042 0.0024 0.0024 -0.1526
Table 5: MMNL estimated arc elasticities, 5 percent price rise of row fascia, OSS data
31 While it may appear that the sum of cross price elasticity estimates exceeds the own price elasticity
estimate for some stores, contrary to the prediction of microeconomic theory, this observation is
somewhat misleading because the point estimates are random variables. In order to precise and test
such an assessment, one would have to consider the variances and covariances of all the estimates
involved in this comparison.
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Fascia own price elasticity cross price elasticity
Asda -0.3678 0.1781
Coop -0.7105 4.71e-10
M&S -0.7308 1.81e-10
Morrisons -0.4537 0.1173
Sainsbury’s -0.4852 0.1505
Somerfield -0.7888 0.0453
Tesco -0.3359 0.2336
Waitrose -0.7441 0.0372
Table 6: MNL estimated point elasticities
The MMNL estimates in table 5 suggest that Asda, Morrisons and Tesco are each
others’ strongest competitors, while Sainsbury is more constrained by Tesco and Morrisons
than by Asda and itself, in turn, imposes a relatively weak constraint on them. The MNL
model is not capable of delivering this more refined competitive assessment. Indeed, apart
from the cross price elasticities being uniform across competitors, Table 6, together with
Table 4, also shows that they are closely aligned with the fascia shares in the sample, e.g.
Tesco’s cross elasticity being 50 percent larger than Asda’s.
The estimated model can also be used to empirically assess the extent to which
consumers will choose more distant OSS shopping in response to a fascia’s price rise.
Table 7 shows the expected increment in distance, in terms of drive time, conditional on
switching to a competing fascia in response to a 5 percent price rise of the row fascia. The
second column displays the fraction of the row fascia’s consumers that are predicted to
switch to more distant stores, while the third column lists the fraction that is predicted to
switch to more distant store with larger sales area than the biggest store of the row fascia
in the choice set. The table suggests that only a relatively small fraction of consumers is
diverted to stores farther away than the stores of the fascia that hypothetically raises price
by 5 percent.
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Distance increment Fraction Fraction
to larger stores
Fascia (in mins) (in %) (in%)
Asda 8.1614 4.24 2.82
Coop 10.0336 4.15 2.56
M&S 7.2744 3.44 2.38
Morrisons 8.3299 4.68 3.35
Sainsbury’s 6.7438 4.24 2.21
Somerfield 7.6990 9.18 5.65
Tesco 9.5841 8.56 5.21
Waitrose 8.1293 1.68 0.70
Table 7: Predicted substitution effects, OSS, 5 percent price increase
Similarly, the substitution pattern to large stores in response to a price rise can be
estimated. Table 8 displays the respective proportions switching to stores of various size
categories in response to a 5 percent price rise of the row fascia. Column (1) provides
the row fascia’s predicted market share after it hypothetically raises its price by 5 percent;
column (2) the predicted market share loss, i.e. the difference between column (1) and
the second column in Table 4; column (3) and column (7) are the ex post market shares
of the row fascia’s stores with net sales area exceeding 2000m2 and 1400m2, respectively;
column (4) corresponds to the predicted loss in market share accruing at stores of at least
2000m2 net sales area; this can be compared with the row fascia’s market share diverted to
competitor stores with net sales area exceeding 2000m2 (column (5)) and 1400m2 (column
(8)); columns (6) and (9) put diverted markets shares to competitors with at least 2000m2
and 1400m2 sales area in proportion to total lost market share, i.e. columns (5) and (8) in
relation to column (2). The results in Table 8 suggest large proportions of diverted demand
in response to a price rise accrue at large stores. On average, about two thirds accrue at
stores with net sales area exceeding 2000m2, and for the big four UK grocers four fifth
accrue at stores with net sales area of at least 1400m2
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Fascia (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Asda 14.85 -12.68 14.54 -12.37 8.49 66.96 14.78 10.34 81.56
Coop 3.31 -0.64 0.11 -0.02 0.43 67.88 0.35 0.52 80.90
M&S 3.01 -0.57 0.03 -0.00 0.37 65.56 0.38 0.44 77.51
Morrisons 10.62 -3.88 8.14 -2.95 2.82 72.79 10.30 3.18 81.85
Sainsbury’s 8.47 -1.99 6.29 -1.48 1.29 65.10 7.31 1.54 77.30
Somerfield 3.76 -0.59 0.08 -0.01 0.38 64.45 0.44 0.46 77.12
Tesco 23.71 -7.24 14.90 -4.61 5.72 78.94 18.17 6.53 90.14
Waitrose 1.12 -0.20 0.24 -0.04 0.12 58.56 0.63 0.15 71.82
Table 8: Predicted substitution effects by store size, OSS data; in percent
6.3 Non-OSS Data
This subsection presents estimates based on the sample of non-OSS trips. Table 9 parallels
Table 3 in the first subsection and summarizes MNL and MMNL point estimates, next to
standard error estimates as described above.
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MNL std.error MMNL std.error min max
distance (intercept) -0.26880 0.0030 -1.1625 0.1189 -1.2698 -0.8402
distance (hh size) -0.2266 0.0700 -0.4450 -0.1949
distance (soc gr DE) 5.0732 0.3065 4.5382 5.5564
distance (cars > 0) 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0008 0.0010
distance (std dev) 0.4896 0.0588 0.3298 0.5483
net sales area -0.0387 0.0165 -2.1372 0.1369 -2.2448 -1.7962
mission cost 9.6093 0.7344 4.2533 0.1899 4.0103 4.5726
petrol 0.0708 0.0381 4.3551 0.3244 4.0516 5.2095
ATMs 0.0979 0.0537 0.1523 0.0070 0.1466 0.1708
restaurant 0.0812 0.0434 -0.7919 0.0154 -0.8229 -0.7640
toilets 0.0777 0.0529 2.8392 2.4955 -4.2338 4.2201
price (intercept) -4.3474 0.7686 4.4615 0.0785 4.3886 4.6100
price (hh size) 0.3935 0.0169 0.3581 0.4205
price (soc gr DE) 4.3967 0.1530 3.9896 4.5620
price (std dev) 0.9935 0.0401 1.0466 0.9048
Asda 19.8140 751.5414 1.8231 0.0678 1.7003 1.9597
M&S 2.5765 1144.392 -3.9083 0.3189 -4.6720 -3.4679
Morrions 20.0350 751.5414 2.0171 0.1048 1.8600 2.2631
Sainsbury’s 20.9548 751.5413 1.2049 0.0331 1.1565 1.2806
Somerfield 23.755 751.5413 -5.1998 0.6151 -6.9144 -4.7924
Tesco 19.9693 751.5414 5.0932 0.1695 4.7679 5.2790
Waitrose 23.2831 751.5413 1.0780 0.1766 0.9793 1.5597
distance price cov -0.3049 0.0122 -0.3307 -0.2910
Table 9: ML and MSL estimation results; non-OSS data.
As one might expect for non-OSS trips, the implied arc price elasticities are estimated
to be slightly lower than in case of OSS trips. Table 10 provides the respective derived
MMNL estimates.
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Asda Coop MS Morr. Sains. Somerf. Tesco Waitr.
Asda -0.4220 0.0274 0.0238 0.1824 0.0421 0.0178 0.2327 0.0145
Coop 0.0051 -0.1624 0.0082 0.0078 0.0085 0.0084 0.0078 0.0071
M&S 0.0042 0.0076 -0.1603 0.0064 0.0095 0.0075 0.0068 0.0105
Morr 0.0548 0.0245 0.0212 -0.2598 0.0314 0.0178 0.0565 0.0138
Sains 0.0183 0.0212 0.0253 0.0245 -0.1875 0.0183 0.0291 0.0290
Somerf 0.0044 0.0107 0.0101 0.0074 0.0094 -0.1388 0.0066 0.0085
Tesco 0.1236 0.0546 0.0507 0.1529 0.0880 0.0345 -0.2233 0.0459
Wait 0.0011 0.0027 0.0043 0.0017 0.0044 0.0025 0.0025 -0.1529
Table 10: MMNL estimated arc elasticities, 5 percent price rise of row fascia, non-OSS data
Similarly, non-OSS is slightly more local, or more sensitive to distance, both in the
MNL and the MMNL model. This implies somewhat smaller expected incremental travel
distance in response to a 5 percent price rise, conditional on switching. Table 11 provides
comparators for non-OSS to Table 7.
Distance increment Fraction Fraction
to larger stores
Fascia (in mins) (in %) (in%)
Asda 8.5246 4.40 2.50
Coop 9.3949 3.92 2.14
M&S 7.8290 3.80 2.14
Morrisons 9.2949 4.52 2.38
Sainsbury’s 5.5781 5.23 3.57
Somerfield 7.8619 8.68 5.83
Tesco 6.7482 9.27 6.42
Waitrose 7.1613 0.83 0.59
Table 11: Predicted substitution effects in terms of distance and size, non-OSS
Finally, substitution patterns with respect to store size can be inferred for non-OSS
trips, comparable to the results for OSS trips in Table 8 above. For non-OSS trips, the
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corresponding derived estimates are reported in Table 12, with column definitions as for
Table 8.
Fascia (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Asda 15.08 -11.01 14.75 -10.75 7.30 66.33 15.01 8.95 81.26
Coop 3.47 -0.67 0.11 -0.02 0.45 67.38 0.37 0.54 80.75
M&S 3.20 -0.61 0.03 -0.01 0.40 65.02 0.40 0.47 77.24
Morr 11.01 -3.87 8.39 -2.93 2.79 72.16 10.68 3.15 81.50
Sains 9.02 -2.08 6.66 -1.55 1.33 64.10 7.75 1.60 76.77
Somerf 3.94 -0.63 0.08 -0.01 0.41 64.19 0.47 0.49 77.02
Tesco 24.77 -7.12 15.43 -4.50 5.60 78.63 18.96 6.38 89.54
Wait 1.24 -0.22 0.24 -0.04 0.13 58.02 0.67 0.16 71.63
Table 12: Predicted substitution effects by store size, non-OSS data; in percent
A comparison of Tables 8 and 12 suggests that Asda and Tesco lose a slightly larger
share of the OSS market than in the non-OSS market in response to a hypothetical 5
percent price rise, while the opposite holds for for smaller retailers such as Coop, M&S,
Sainsbury’s and Somerfield. For Morrisons, the estimated effect is about the same for the
two types of shopping. The previous finding that large proportions of OSS is diverted to
stores with large net sales area appears to also hold for non-OSS.
In summary, the results delivered by the analysis provide evidence of heterogeneity
in consumers sensitivity to price and distance attributes of the relevant retail offering,
controlling for other observable attributes of choice alternatives and taking account of
the consumer’s socio-demographic profile. Poorer consumers are found to be more price
and distance sensitive than richer consumers; larger households are more price sensitive,
but, being more likely to own a car, are less sensitive to distance; unobserved consumer
characteristics that are likely to govern their sensitivity to distance, e.g. health and physical
mobility, are found to be negatively correlated with those that govern their sensitivity to
price.
The analysis also presents own and cross price elasticities of fascia choice probabilities.
These suggest that Asda, Morrisons and Tesco are each others’ strongest competitors, while
Sainsbury is more constrained by Tesco and Morrisons than by Asda and itself, in turn,
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imposes a relatively weak constraint on them. Moreover, the estimated model suggests that,
in response to a fascia’s price rise, only a relatively small fraction of consumers is prepared
to incur higher travel costs conditional on switching to competing fascias, between 1 and
9 percent, regardless of shopping type; the induced travel costs arise from more distant
shopping, with increments estimated to range from 6 to 10 minutes for OSS, and from 5.5
to 9 minutes for non-OSS. Similarly, conditional on switching to a competitor in response
to a fascia’s price increase, the estimated model suggests that on average two thirds of the
diverted consumption goes to large stores, with net sales area above 2000 m2, and for the
big four UK fascias four fifth is diverted to stores with net sales area above 1400 m2; only
a comparably small fraction is predicted to turn to smaller stores. This suggests that store
size is a defining strategic variable with regard to a fascia’s design of the product offering.
These findings appear robust with respect to the two definitions of shopping employed in
the analysis, OSS and non-OSS.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a micro-econometric framework for geographic antitrust market
definition and competitive assessment, embedded into the classical hypothetical monopolist
test paradigm. Focussing on its demand-side component, it presents a demand model in an
application for UK grocery retailing that captures the essential trade-off between distance
and pecuniary costs. It builds on a general random utility model for fascia choice that
allows for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in consumer preferences. It identifies
socio-demographic household characteristics that drive price and distance sensitivity in
one-stop and non-one-stop grocery shopping. The analysis suggests a trade-off between
sensitivity with respect to price and distance, with poorer households being more sensitive
to both and larger households being more sensitive to price, while being less resistant to
more distant shopping. With regard to competition relevant insights, this analysis provides
evidence that, in response to a fascia’s hypothetical price rises, most consumers who switch
to a competitor fascia are likely to switch to one with larger net sales area, but only a small
fraction of those who switch are expected to travel further to do their grocery shopping.
These findings appear robust with respect to the definition of shopping employed in the
analysis.
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Future work will use this model, nested within the framework of Section 2, to combine
it with cost or margin data in order to define hypothetically monopolizable markets, similar
to Davis (2006) and Smith (2004).
A Construction of Price Measures32
The price measure is based on the responses to main parties questionnaire (MPQ) question
58, in which the CC defined about 220 product categories and asked parties to provide
store-level prices for their top-selling product (SKU) in the particular category (top-selling
across all stores of the party, e.g. for Tesco top-selling across all Tesco fascias including
One-Stop).
This implies that, for many product categories, the given prices are not for the same
product (e.g. for ice-cream one party gives the Häagen-Dazs price and another gives the
own-label price.)
1) Selection of component goods
For the six product definitions covered in the Brands-basket, however, (almost) all
parties gave prices for exactly the same product (e.g. for lemonade the price of Schweppes
Original Lemonade.)
The larger baskets were determined by selecting those 47 out of the 220 product
definitions that will not include well-known brands (KVI) - these product definitions
mainly relate to basic groceries like flour, fruits, vegetables, meat, etc. However, most
stores did not seem to sell all 47 products in this basket. Therefore, the number of products
in the basket was iteratively reduced by those products with the largest shares of missing
values across stores, to arrive at basket sizes of 33, 16 and 12 products. Therefore, by
definition store coverage of the respective price measure increases when the number of
products in the basket decreases.
Since most stores seem to sell the six branded products, these were added to the above
16- and 12-product baskets to increase their product coverage without loosing too many
stores.
2) Weights
32 With thanks to Jonathan Beck for contributing this section on the construction of price measures.
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In the "Plain" version or the price measure, the posted prices of the component products
are simply added. Thus each has the same weight.
In the "Weighted" version of the price measure, the total revenue generated by sales
of the component goods were calculated across all stores (national GBP-sales of the
component goods). Each product weight in the basket is then its share in total basket
revenues (national GBP-sales of this product divided by national GBP-sales of all products
in the basket). Thus the price of bananas tends to have a larger weight in the price measure
in which it is included, while the price of cabbage tends to have a small weight.
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